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Abstract 
The role of “relational goods” is almost unexplored in the literature, yet our experimental results 
document that, even in their weakest form (opportunity of meeting an unknown player at the 
end  of  an  experimental  game),  they  significantly  affect important  “lubricants”  of  economic 
activity such as trust and trustworthiness and generate significant departures from the standard 
Nash equilibrium outcome in investment games. Our findings do not reject the hypothesis that 
relational goods are an important “source of energy” in economic interactions and that the study 
of this “neglected particle” of socioeconomic life may produce significant advancements on 
both positive and normative economics. 
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1. Introduction 
In analogy with physics, progress in economics may be conceived as being based on the discovery 
of new “particles” which improve our knowledge and give us a clearer and more detailed picture of 
the functioning and effects of interactions among agents in the economic system. Traditionally, 
economic theorists have modelled such system through the interaction of homines economici, or 
purely self-interested individuals maximising their utilities uniquely oriented to material outcomes 
in a perfect information framework.  
Experimental and behavioral economists documented violations of the hypothesis that economic 
agents are exclusively motivated by the pursue of their material self-interest. Such violations led to 
a broadened perspective on human preferences and are generally interpreted as evidence supporting 
the existence of trust, fairness, strategic fairness, inequity aversion, altruism, etc. (Rabin, 1993; 
Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Frey, 1997; Levine, 1998, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Andreoni 
and Miller, 2002; Charness and Rabin, 2002).  
Even  though  the  picture  is  becoming  more  and  more  realistic  still  many  dimensions  of  the 
functioning of the economic system remain unexplored. 
With this paper we argue that relational goods are one of the hidden “particles” which help to 
explain the movement of those already discovered. More specifically, we find that relational goods 
have significant effects on trust and trustworthiness. In our experimental study we observe that even 
the weakest form of them (taste/distaste arising from the possibility of a pleasing/nasty encounter 
with an unknown player at the end of the game) generates significantly higher levels of trust and 
trustworthiness. This nexus is important as it implies that relational goods may create the premises 
for more fruitful economic relationships, since trust has been shown to be the “lubricant” (Arrow, 
1974) of the socioeconomic system
1 in many theoretical and empirical contributions.
2  
                                                
1 On the definition of trust and on the distinction between particularized and generalized trust see Knack and Keefer 
(1997); Stolle and Rochon (1998) and Narayan, (1999), Berggren e Jordahl, (2006).   3 
The paper is divided in six sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the second section 
we provide a short survey of the literature on relational goods. In the third section we describe our 
experimental design. In the fourth section we discuss our descriptive and econometric findings. In 
the fifth session a potential application of our findings is proposed. The sixth section concludes. 
 
2. The concept of relational goods 
Over the last few years, economic analysis has devoted more and more attention to the role of 
factors connected with interpersonal relations. One of the main attempts that economists have made 
in  order  to  improve  their  understanding  of  them  is  linked  to  the  concept  of  relational  goods. 
Relational  goods  “depend  upon  interactions  among  persons”  (Ulhaner  1989,  p.  253)  and  are 
peculiar intangible outputs of an affective and communicative nature (Gui 2000) that are produced 
through social interactions. In particular, Gui (2002) proposes to consider every form of interaction 
as  a  particular  productive  process  that  the  author  calls  encounter.  Relational  goods  may  be 
generated in an encounter, but they are not the encounter in itself, which can generate many other 
different outputs
3 (Gui 2000, p.155). Examples of relational goods are: social approval, solidarity, 
friendship  and  its  benefit,  the  desire  to  be  recognized  or  accepted  by  others,  but  also  the 
“atmosphere” that is created among waiting customers in a hair dresser’s shop, or a conversation 
concerning non-professional matters occurring during breaks in a business meeting” Gui (2000, p. 
152). By looking at these examples, it is clear that relational goods can be either an asset, like a 
friendship, or else, a one-shot consumer good like the “atmosphere” that is created among waiting 
customers in a hair dresser’s shop or, more in general, the relational goods associated with the 
                                                                                                                                                            
2 Several contributions have shown that trust has an important impact on socio-economic performance. At an aggregate 
level, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) find that the level of trust in a given country has positive 
effects on economic growth. Putnam (1993) and La Porta et al. (1997 and 1999) highlight the role of trust in improving 
government  performance.  Becchetti  and  Pace  (2006)  and  Fullenkamp  and  Chami  (2002)  analyse  with  theoretical 
models the effects of trust on firms’ efficiency. 
3 Examples of outputs which are accounted for by standard economic concepts and which are produced during an 
encounter  are:  the  reallocation  of  goods  of  people  involved in the  interaction   (e.g  a  buyer  and  a  seller) and  the 
provision of a service (e.g in case of a legal advice) (Gui 2000).   4 
“well-being” (or “bad-being”) produced by a conversation with other people (Bruni and Stanca 
2005)  
Relational goods have three main characteristics. First, they are a subset of local public goods, 
since they are non rival and non exclusive but only with regard to the people who participate in their 
production. According to Uhlaner, “Relational goods can only be enjoyed with some others. They 
are thus unlike private goods, which are enjoyed alone, and standard public goods, which can be 
enjoyed by any number” (Uhlaner 1989, p.254).The consumption of relational goods is contextual 
and  simultaneous  to  their  production,  since  they  can  not  be  enjoyed  alone,  but  only  through 
interpersonal relations with other people (Sacco and Vanin 2000; Bruni and Stanca, 2005).They can 
be  actually  considered  anti-rival  since  the  joint  fruition  is  essential  to  their  value.  Second, 
contributions  to  their  production  depend  on    mutual  agreement  (Uhlaner  1989).  Goodwill  is 
important for their production, they can not be imposed. Even though relational goods may be 
generated through encounters which happen in different environments, some circumstances seem 
more  convenient  than  others.  In  particular,  relations  that  are  not  constrained  but  that  people 
voluntarily decide to start, such as relations inside volunteering associations, are more likely to 
generate  relational  goods  (Prouteau  and  Wolff,  2004).  Third,  their  value  depends  on  the 
characteristics of people sharing the goods (Sacco and Vanin 2000) and is increased by fellow 
feeling.
4  With  this  respect,  one  could  prefer  to  share  time  with  people  she  trusts  or  she  finds 
friendly.  For  this  reason,  the  expected  value  of  relational  goods’  consumption  depends  on  the 
disposition that agents have on the personal characteristics of people they are going to meet. A good 
disposition increases the probability that agents enjoy the encounter and, consequently, the quality 
of the relational good produced (and consumed) by it. On the contrary, feelings such as rancour or 
envy can interfere with their production (and, consequently, with their consumption). Therefore, it 
is clear that some circumstances can promote better than other their creation.  
                                                
4 The fellow feeling hypothesis of Adam Smith has been recently re-elaborated by Sugden (2002) arguing that the 
intensity  of  common  consent  (and  “the  consequent  removal  of  unease  and  dissonance  caused  by  perception  of 
disparities in sentiments”) is a source of pleasure in relational activities.   5 
Until now relational goods have been mostly considered to explain social behaviour such as 
political participation (Uhlaner 1989) or associational membership (Prouteau and Wolff 2004). Our 
analysis opens a new interesting field testing whether the possibility of consuming relational goods 
has a direct impact also on variables such as trust and trustworthiness that are key elements for 
socio-economic development. 
 
2.1 Relational goods and trust: an experimental analysis 
In our experiment, we introduce the possibility to consume relational goods through a personal 
interaction that agents will share after having played a two-player Investment Game (Berg et al., 
1995). As it is well known the latter is a sequential game in which the two players are both endowed 
with an amount of money S, and the first mover, the Trustor, must decide what share of S to send to 
the second mover, the Trustee. The amount sent is tripled and delivered to the Trustee, who must 
decide how much of the tripled amount to give back to the second mover.
5 Before playing the game 
we give agents the possibility to declare if they want to meet the other player or if they do not. If 
agents opt for the encounter, by playing the Investment Game, they have the possibility to affect, 
inside an economic transaction, the disposition of the other players on their own characteristics.  
The Trustor can affect the disposition that the receiver has towards her by showing herself 
trustful.  A  trustful  contribution  by  the  Trustor  reveals  the  willingness  to  create  a  cooperative 
relation with the Trustee and creates positive conditions for the production of relational goods after 
the game. On the social and economic point of view such contribution entails a monetary risk for 
the  Trustor  which  may  traded  off  by  nonmaterial  benefits  generated  by  the  relational  good 
consumed during the encounter.  
The Trustee can, in turn, affect the disposition of the Trustor by showing herself trustworthy (i.e. 
by sending back to the Trustor a “fair” amount). The trade-off between giving away monetary 
benefits to “pay” non material gains applies also to her.  
                                                
5 For details on the experimental design see the following section.   6 
Even if experimental results on Ultimatum games (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982, 
Camerer and Thaler 1995), Dictator Games (Andreoni and Miller 2002), Gift Exchange Games 
(Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Reidl, 1993, Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter 1998), Trust Games 
(Berg,  Dickhaut  and  McCabe  1995,  Ben-Ner  e  Putterman  2006)  and  Public  Good  Games 
(Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr 2001, Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman 1999, Fehr and Gächter 
2000) have widely stressed that human behaviour is also strongly motivated by the consideration of 
others  (i.e.,  for  example,  by  fairness,  reciprocity  and  inequity  aversion),  we  are  not  aware  of 
previous experimental studies that introduce the possibility of consuming relational goods in order 
to analyse their impact on cooperation.  
Our  work  differs  also  from  studies  devoted  to  the  analysis  of  the  effects  of  pre-play 
communication (see, for example, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996; Bohnet and Frey, 1998; 
Buchan,  Croson  and  Johnson,  2000)  -  and, more  in  general,  of  the  manipulation  of  the  social 
distance between the players - on individual choice in some of the games mentioned above.
6 The 
main  results  of  this  research  is  that  the  reduction  of  the  social  distance  amongst  the  subjects 
facilitates the deviation from purely selfish behaviour. This evidence is explained by presuming that 
“the ‘framing’ of the decision can influence expectations by associating a subject’s decision with 
past experience” (Hoffman, McCabe and Smith, 1996: 655) and, more in general, with her everyday 
social  life.  The  reduction  of  the  social  distance  increases  the  subject’s  concern  for  the  social 
consequences of her decision, and  this results in a higher  probability of adopting in the laboratory 
the same rules which drive her everyday social interactions. 
In our study subjects can decide to remove the anonymity, but they will meet their counterparts 
only at the end of the game and only if their counterparts have decided to meet them as well. This 
reflects a typical fragility of relational goods: individual investment is exposed to the risk of lack of 
correspondence from the counterpart. If a subject decides not to meet her counterpart, she will play 
                                                
6 See, for example, Isaac and Walker (1991), Ledyard (1995), Frey and Bohet (1999), Charness and Gneezy (2000), 
Buchan, Croson and Johnson (2006). See Bicchieri (2002) for an interpretation of the evidence about the effects of pre-
play communication.   7 
a standard anonymous game.
7  This implies that the decision about the meeting is part of player’s 
strategy: she can freely determine the social distance between herself and her counterpart. 
In our analysis, Trustors and Trustees who decide to meet the other player after the game could 
decide to be relatively more trustful and trustworthy in order to increase the expected value of the 
relational goods they have the possibility to produce through the encounter. In this perspective the 
reason why agents choose to meet their counterpart does not have a key role in our approach. What 
really matters is that this decision opens the possibility to produce and consume relational goods 
with others.  
An important qualification, relevant to our experiment, is that the concept of relational good 
may vary from a minimum to a maximum content. In our case the minimum content is just the 
desire to avoid the hostility of the counterpart, while the maximum content may be the hope to build 
a friendship with the other player starting from the small joint experience lived during the game. 
We may just observe in the experiment whether contributions grow when the opportunity of the 
encounter is provided (and/or is chosen by the two players), but we cannot discriminate whether the 
players do it by having in mind the minimum or the maximum content of the relational good.  
 
3. Experimental design and procedure 
The experiment is based on a standard two-player Investment Game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 
1995). At the beginning of the game both players are endowed with 10 tokens (1 token=0.50 euros). 
The first mover, the Trustor, must decide how much of her endowment to send to the second mover, 
the Trustee. The amount sent is tripled and delivered to the Trustee, who must decide how much of 
the tripled sum to send back to the Trustee (Figure 1). Assuming that players have purely self-
interested preferences, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game is the strategy vector in 
which the Trustee sends 0 and the Trustor sends 0.  
 
                                                
7 According to the role of goodwill stressed in section 2, the voluntary character of the encounter should create a 
favourable environment for the creation of relational goods.   8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We combine the experimental analysis of the Investment Game with a survey aimed at collecting 
socio-demographic data and information about subjects’ attitudes, habits, feelings, satisfaction with 
their life and work, and like
8. As it will be shown in the empirical section of the paper, the survey 
helps to control for composition effects which may explain our results and, above all, for selection 
bias problems which may arise when we compare two subsamples which are discriminated on the 
basis of a non-random voluntary individual choice (that of meeting the other player). In such case 
we need to discriminate whether differences between the two subsamples are generated by the 
experiment or by the factors which affected individual’s choices of entering one of the two samples 
(see section  4.2). 
Subjects played the Investment Game under different conditions: (i) the experimental sessions have 
been conducted in three Italian universities, University of Trento, University of Milano-Bicocca, 
and University of Forlì; (ii) part of the subjects filled the survey before playing the game, while 
                                                
8 Example of studies based on this combination of classical surveys and experiments based on simple games are, among 
others, those of  Glaeser et al.(2000) and Fehr et al. (2003).  
Figure 1. The Investment Game 
Trustor 
Trustee 
x = 10  x = 0 
y = 3x  y = 0 
Trustor’s payoff= 10-x+y 
Trustee’s payoff = 10+3x-y   9 
another part of them filled it after the game was played; finally (iii) only half of the subjects had the 
possibility to choose whether to opt for meeting the counterpart, knowing that the encounter would 
take place at the end of the experiment but only if both players agreed on it.  
As  a  consequence,  we  had  three  treatment  variables:  Location,  Survey  and  Meeting  and  the 
experiment consisted of eleven treatments:
9 i) Baseline treatment in Trento (TB); ii) Encounter 
Treatment in Trento with survey beforehand (T1B); iii) Encounter Treatment in Trento with survey 
afterwards (T1A); iv) Baseline treatment in Milano with survey beforehand (MBB); v) Baseline 
treatment in Milano with survey afterwards (MBA); vi) Encounter Treatment in Milano with survey 
beforehand  (M1B);  vii)  Encounter  Treatment  in  Milano  with  survey  afterwards  (M1A);  viii) 
Baseline treatment in Forlì with survey beforehand (FBB); ix) Baseline treatment in Forlì with 
survey  afterwards  (FBA);  x)  Encounter  Treatment  in  Forlì  with  survey  beforehand  (F1B);  xi) 
Encounter Treatment in Forlì with survey afterwards (F1A).  
We adopted a between-subjects design, that is, each subject participated only in one treatment for a 
total of 368 subjects. Each session lasted on average 45 minutes. Participants earned on average € 
10.50 (including a show-up fee of € 3).  
At the University of Trento subjects were recruited by posting ads at various departments
10, while at 
Universities of Milano-Bicocca and Forlì they were recruited by email
11. The participants were all 
students  enrolled  in  different  programs  of  study,  even  though  most  of  them  were  students  of 
Economics.   
In all the treatments subjects used a computer for both playing the game and filling the survey. The 
experiment was conducted under complete anonymity and without communication.  
                                                
9For further details on the experimental design  see Appendix 2. 
10  Ads  were  posted  one  week  before  the  experiment.  Subscriptions  by  students  interested  in  participating  to  the 
experiment were collected by the staff of the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the 
University of Trento.  
11 Subject were students included in the mailing list of the Experimental Economics Laboratories (EELAB and LES). 
Two weeks before the experiment they received an email in which the staff invited them to visit the Laboratory’s 
website for information about the experiment and subscriptions.    10 
Two experimenters were in the room during the sessions. The same two experimenters conducted 
all the sessions.  
In each session experimenters selected the role (Trustor or Trustee) of one player for each computer 
terminal and linked it with another terminal in the room before the subjects entered it. Upon their 
arrival, subjects picked a slip of paper with an alphanumerical identification code from a box and 
chose one of the terminals at random (Appendix 2). In this way, when sitting at one terminal, 
participants were automatically assigned their role and paired with their counterparts.  
Subjects were handed written instructions
12 which were read aloud by one of the experimenters. 
They signed in by entering their personal identification code on their terminals, discovered their 
role and played the game. Each Trustor decided how many tokens to send to the Trustee, a message 
with the number of tokens sent by the Trustor appeared on the Trustee monitor, and finally the 
Trustee made her choice. The payoff of the players appeared on their monitors and the game was 
over. Subjects were paid just after the end of the experiment.  
In treatments with survey afterwards, subjects first played the game and then filled the survey.  
In treatments with survey beforehand, subjects first filled the survey and then played the game.
13  
In treatments with the option of the encounter, before playing the game, independent of the fact that 
the survey was before or after the game, subjects had the possibility to decide whether to meet their 
counterpart at the end of the experiment. More precisely, subjects had the possibility to decide with 
regard to the encounter, as explained in Appendix 2, after the experimenter read the instructions 
about the investment game and before they signed in and discovered their role.
14 Subjects were 
handed a form with the following question: “Do you want to meet, at the end of the experiment, the 
person you are going to play with?”. They were informed of the fact that the meeting would take 
                                                
12 Experimental instructions are available from the authors on request. 
13 By randomizing the moment in which subjects fill in the survey we try to reduce the risk of distorting effects.  The 
survey before may create framing effects, while the survey after may lead to rationalise the behaviour followed during 
the experiment in survey answers. 
14 It means that in treatments T1B, M1B and FB1 everything is as in T1A,  M1A and F1A, except for the fact that the 
subjects filled the survey before playing the game, (more precisely, before the experimenter read the instruction about 
the game, see Appendix 2).   11 
place only if both players replied with a “Yes”. Experimenters collected the forms with subjects’ 
answers and the game started. Notice that when subjects made their choices about the encounter 
they knew the rules of the game, but they did not know which role they were going to play.  
If both players opted for the encounter, they actually met at the end of the experiment. 
 
4.1 Descriptive findings on Trustors 
By just looking at the distributions of Trustor’s contributions we find that the share of Trustors 
following a behaviour consistent with Nash equilibrium when players have standard self-interested 
preferences based only on monetary arguments
15 (that is, sending no money to the Trustee, which 
we define from now on as standard (textbook) behaviour for simplicity) is 11.41 on the overall 
sample of 184 observations. It rises to 19.78 percent in the 91 cases in which the opportunity of the 
encounter is not available and falls sharply to 3.22 percent in the same number of cases in which the 
opportunity is offered (Table 1)
16. Within this subsample the share is slightly higher for Trustors 
who do not opt (4.17 percent on 48 cases) and slightly smaller for those who opt for the encounter 
(2.22 percent with 45 cases).  
Hence, the opportunity of consuming a relational good has significant effects on the deviation from 
the standard behaviour. This finding shows that, with a slight departure from an aseptic context 
with no possibility of creating relational goods, benchmark concepts, such as Nash equilibria under 
the assumption of self-interested players, become less and less adequate to describe agents’ choices. 
On another perspective we may as well interpret our finding by arguing that absence of relational 
opportunities reduces the capacity to create trust and trustworthiness and the productivity gains 
which may arise from cooperation. 
                                                
15 The analytical Appendix of the paper actually shows that Trustors sending zero contributions may have a taste for 
relational goods and that even Trustors who follow standard Nash rationality may be induced to send some money if 
they believe that the Trustee will not be of their kind. 
16 The passage from a zero contribution to a positive one when the opportunity of the meeting is provided does not 
imply that the Trustor does not follow standard behaviour as her choice may depend just on the assumption that the 
counterpart has adopted a non-standard one.   12 
The comparison of the average Trustor’s contribution under two different treatments (when the 
option of meeting the Trustee is available or not) yields results consistent with those commented 
above (Table 2). The average contribution is significantly larger when the option is available (5.16 
tokens) than when it is not (3.78 tokens ) and the difference in means is significant at 95 percent
17. 
This implies that the simple availability of the opportunity of the encounter raises on average the 
Trustor contribution, independently from her decision to meet the counterpart. Given the standard 
assumption that the amount given by the Trustor is tripled, our finding implies that, on average, the 
“aggregate  gain”  generated  by  the  option  of  the  encounter  -  i.e.  the  extra  amount  of  tokens 
generated by it - is 15.48-11.40 = 4.08 tokens or a 42.1% increase with respect to the benchmark in 
which the relational good is not available.  
It may be argued that the result is determined by the expected larger contribution of those who 
actually opt for the possibility of the encounter when the option is available. However, this does not 
seem to explain the entire story since the mean contribution of those who have the opportunity but 
do not opt for the encounter is still higher (4.37 tokens) than that of those who are devoid of such 
opportunity  (3.78  tokens).  An  interpretation  for  this  finding  may  be  that  part  of  the  higher 
contribution of the sender in presence of the opportunity to opt for the encounter is independent 
from  the  Trustor’s  decision  to  opt  for  it  and  has  a  strategic  component,  represented  by  the 
anticipation that the Trustee may be willing to pay back more if she opts for the encounter (see 
Appendix 1). Consider, however, that the difference between those who have the possibility to opt 
and do not and those who are not given such opportunity is only weakly significant both with 
parametric and non parametric tests (77 percent significance). 
When we restrict our descriptive analysis within the sample of the 93 Trustors who are given the 
opportunity to opt for the encounter, we observe that the average contribution of those who opt 
                                                
17 Since the distribution of Trustor’s contributions departs from normality we also consider non parametric diagnostics 
and find that the significance is confirmed by Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test=  -2.940 Prob > |z| = 0.003. 
   13 
(6.82 tokens) is significantly higher than that of those who do not opt (4.37 tokens)
18. As explained 
with analytical details in Appendix 1 what we have actually tested here is a joint null hypothesis 
that i) Trustors have a positive taste for relational goods and ii) they believe that, by contributing 
more, they can positively affect the disposition of  the counterpart and therefore enjoy a  richer 
relational good. 
By evaluating this finding jointly with those commented above we may say that the effect generated 
by the possibility of consuming a relational good goes beyond the “strategic rationale” since most 
of the difference is between those who opt and those who do not when the opportunity is available. 
However, given the limited number of observations in our sample, a strategic component cannot be 
excluded, even though the difference between those who do not opt by having the opportunity and 
those who do not have such opportunity is not strongly significant. 
With  regard  to  the  other  two  variants  in  our  design    (location  and  timing  of  the  survey),  the 
comparison  of  the  average  amount  sent  across  the  3*2  different  experiment  contexts  (Milano, 
Trento, Forlì, questionnaire before and questionnaire after) shows that differences are minimal and 
not significant.  
 
4.2 Econometric findings on Trustors  
To  examine  whether  composition  effects  may  contribute  to  explain  our  findings  we  perform 
regression analysis on our experimental data. A preliminary exploration on all survey variables 
available in our database (related to objective personal characteristics) shows that the only factors 
which seem to affect significantly the Trustor’s contribution are sex (males give more) and the 
number of family members. We therefore introduce these variables as controls in the estimates 
together with the level of income which is a standard control in these types of estimates.  
Our  first  econometric  test  is  on  the  effect  of  the  opportunity  to  opt  for  the  encounter  on  the 
likelihood  that an  individual  will  behave  consistently  with  the  standard  behavior  (Tab.3).  Our 
                                                
18 The significance is confirmed by the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test: test= -2.451 Prob > |z| 
= 0.014).   14 
findings confirm here what was already evident in descriptive statistics. The effect of such option 
has a significant and negative effect, together with that of the number of family members. The result 
is robust to the change in the survey-experiment sequence and to the place of the experiment. A 
remarkable finding here is that in the subsample of “survey after the game” and in the case of 
“Trento  sessions”  and  “Forlì  sessions”,  the  “encounter”  dummy  predicts  failure  (dependent 
variable=0 or absence of standard behaviour) perfectly 
We then focus on the amount sent by the Trustors and consider that our dependent variable (the 
amount sent by the Trustors) is discrete qualitative as it takes integer values from 0 to 10. The most 
suitable approach is therefore an ordered logit  estimate, even though, given its extended range, a 
dependent variable with identical range has been sometimes approximated in the literature to a 
continuous one so that OLS models have also been estimated (see Frey and Stutzer, 2005 in case of 
life satisfaction estimates). 
Consistently  with  such  literature,  we  therefore  decide  to  provide  both  OLS  and  ordered  logit 
estimates (Tab. 4). The estimate on the sample of the 93 individuals who are given the opportunity 
to opt for the encounter shows that the dummy which takes the value of one when the Trustor opts 
for the encounter and zero otherwise, is strongly positive and significant. The extra contribution 
with respect to the average one provided when opting from the encounter is between 26% and 33% 
Consider, however, that our experiment is subject to a typical selection bias problem since the 
definition of the treatment and control sample is not random, but determined by a decision of the 
subjects undergoing the experiment. It is therefore possible in principle that the significantly higher 
contribution provided when opting for the encounter is not determined by the possibility of the 
encounter itself, but by the same ex ante characteristics which led individuals to choose this option. 
To evaluate whether the decision to opt for the encounter is significantly affected by individual 
characteristics we regress, in turn, the Rgoods dummy variable (which takes value of one if the 
Trustor  opts  for  the  encounter  in  treatments  in  which  the  option  is  available)  on  all  variables   15 
included in our survey. We find that only one variable (the marriage status of player’s parents) has 
significant effects (at 1%) on this decisions. 
We therefore estimate the following treatment regression model  
(1.1)  i i Rgoods Income Nmembers Male Amountsent ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0  
(1.2)  i i Parmarried Rgoods ν β β + + = 1 0  
where, in the first equation, Amountsent is the Trustor’s contribution, Male is a gender dummy, 
Nmembers is the number of family members, Income is the Trustor’s level of income and Rgoods a 
dummy which takes value of one if the Trustor is given the opportunity of the encounter and opts 
for it. In the second equation the Rgoods dummy is regressed on the marriage status of her parents 
(Parmarried).  
In the two equation system (v) and (ε) are bivariate normal random variables with zero mean and 
covariance matrix 
1
σ ρ
ρ
 
 
 
. The likelihood function for the joint estimation of (1.1) and (1.2) is 
provided by Maddala (1983) and Greene (2003).  
Our results confirm that the decision to opt for the encounter affects significantly and positively the 
amount  sent  by  the  Trustor,  net  of  the  Trustor  characteristics  which  positively  influence  her 
decision (Tab.5), even though its significance is slightly weaker. 
 
4.3 Descriptive statistics on Trustees  
Following the same pattern adopted for the Trustor we start from the distribution of the outcomes of 
the Trustee under five different situations: the overall sample, the samples in which the opportunity 
to opt for the encounter is not given and given and, within the latter, the subsamples in which the 
receiver opts for the encounter and does not (Table 6). 
The dependent variable chosen here is the share of the amount paid back on the total amount 
received.   16 
Note that the share of Trustees behaving consistently with the standard behavior is higher here 
(26.38  percent  on  the  overall  sample  against  11.41  among  Trustors).  This  is  reasonable  if  we 
assume that the Trustee, differently from the Trustor, has no strategic reasons (such as the hope to 
stimulate the contribution of the Trustee) to deviate from the standard behaviour. Another striking 
difference is that most of the variability is not explained just by the opportunity of the encounter 
(conformity to the standard behaviour is even higher for those who are given the opportunity of the 
encounter but do not opt (33.33 percent) than for those who are not given the opportunity) but by 
the actual choice of opting for the encounter (in such case the share of individuals which follows 
standard behaviour drops to 16.67 percent). Our interpretation is that the receiver has no expected 
additional gains from the possibility that, even though she does not opt for the encounter, the other 
player does. Hence there is no point to her in giving more when the option is available but she does 
not want to meet the Trustor.  
This  interpretation  is  also  supported  by  the  fact  that  the  opportunity  of  the  encounter  has  no 
significant effects on the average share paid back
19 (Table 7). 
With respect to the other two variants of the experiment design (location and timing of the survey), 
even  though  Trustees  give  more  on  average  in  Forlì  and  when  the  survey  comes  before  the 
experiment, the difference is not statistically significant (Table 7). 
When we restrict the analysis to the subsample of the 90
20 individuals who have the opportunity to 
opt for the encounter we find that the amount sent back is significantly higher (it almost doubles) 
when the Trustee opts for the encounter (around 35 percent for those who opt against around 21 
percent of those who don’t)
21. Since the distribution of the dependent variable is definitely not 
normal, we use non parametric test to evaluate whether this difference is significant and find that it 
is. 
 
                                                
19 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z = -0.802 Prob > |z| =  0.422. 
20 The sample is slightly smaller than the corresponding one among Trustors since Trustees receiving zero amounts are 
obviously dropped from the sample. 
21 Two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test z = -2.703Prob > |z| =  0.007.   17 
4.4 Econometric findings for Trustees 
In a preliminary econometric analysis we regress our dependent variable (Sharerest) - the ratio of 
the Trustee/Trustor contribution - on each of the survey variables of the questionnaire related to 
objective personal characteristics of the subjects (with the exception of the Rgoods dummy) and 
find that there is no significant effect of any of them.  
The Rgoods dummy is significant and positive (Table 8). In the OLS estimate the magnitude of the 
marginal effect on the amount sent by the Trustee generated by the decision to opt for the encounter 
is quantifiable in a 19 percent increase of the average Trustee contribution.  
Since our preliminary inquiry on the determinants of the Trustee’s decision to opt for the encounter 
demonstrates that the latter is not significantly affected (at 1%) by any variables in our sample, we 
are not able to perform the treatment regression model estimated with regard to the analysis of 
Trustors’ contribution.  
 
5. Potential implications: an application to trust game corporations  
Experimental results may sometime seem far from the economic reality. In this section we want to 
show that our findings may have very concrete economic applications. More specifically we want to 
demonstrate that a better relational environment may contribute significantly to team working
22 and 
firm productivity in what we call modern “trust game corporations”. 
What we mean by this is that the productive activity of a firm originates from the performance of 
complex tasks
23 which require the contribution of knowledge, inventive skills and ideas of workers 
with nonoverlapping human capital endowments. 
                                                
22 Thompson and Wallace (1996) consider that, with the development of lean production and other forms of work 
organization under advanced manufacturing, team working has emerged as a central focus of redesigning production. 
Katz and Rosenberg (2004) argue that ”that the productivity of an organization crucially depends on cooperation among 
workers”  and  highlight  the  importance  of  altruistic  and  cooperative  attributes  in  workers  emphasized  by  the 
organizational  theory  (see,  among  others,  Smith  et  al.  1983;  Organ,  1989;  Organ  and  Ryan,  1995;  McNeely  and 
Meglino, 1994; Penner et al, 1997 and Podsakoff and Mackenzie, 1993). 
23 Consider for instance a blueprint in which different contributor skills are production inputs related by some forms of 
complementarity. Or the definition of a corporate strategy which requires participants from different firm divisions to 
share knowledge and skills. The same scheme could be applied in different (non corporate) fields of activity such as, for 
instance, a co-authored academic working paper to which different researchers contribute with their specialized skills   18 
Consider in a very simple two players game that any complex task consists of a trust game between 
two firm employees, player A and B, endowed with personal skills (stand alone contributions to 
final  output)  that  we  term,  respectively,  as  ha∈R
+  and  hb∈R
+.  The  corporate  trust  game  is  a 
sequential game in which one of the two players (player A, the Trustor) may decide whether sharing 
or not her skills with the other player. In the second stage of the game the second player (player B, 
the Trustee) may decide to cooperate or abuse. We assume that sharing ideas, projects, intuitions 
creates a positive externality - that we introduce in the model as a superadditive component (e∈ 
[0,1]) - generated by the initial knowledge sharing and by the dialogic process of jointly performing 
the task (Figure 2) 
As demonstrated by Becchetti and Pace (2007) such game has a clear productivity paradox since the 
non  sharing  solution  (ha,0)  yielding  a  ”third  best”  suboptimal  firm  output  is  the  SPNE  of  the 
uniperiodal full information game when i) the Trustor has non inferior stand alone contribution to 
output than the Trustee and ii) the superadditive component is inferior to the sum of Trustee and 
Trustor stand alone contributions. 
What this proposition tells is that, if job tasks in modern corporations assume the form of trust 
games, Nash behaviours generate suboptimal productivity results. 
Assume  now  that  workers  care  for  relationships  and  that  any  new  interaction  may  generate  a 
relational good (f) in case of cooperation and destroy the pre-existing stock (F) in case of abuse. 
Becchetti and Pace (2007) show that, in such case, there exists a threshold value of the relational 
good in the Trustee utility function (f*) which triggers the switch from the non cooperative to the 
cooperative (share, not abuse) equilibrium. 
The intuition is that, when relationships matter they can reduce the productivity paradox as far as 
(f), or the utility that players get by not abusing of someone we know of we may meet, is positive. 
It is important to clarify that our basic trust game performed in the experiments does not aim to 
reproduce the corporate investment trust game briefly sketched in this section  but it is basically a 
test on the positive value of (f). The rejection of the insignificance of the relational goods on the   19 
degree of cooperation chosen by Trustor and Trustee in our experiment tells us that economic 
agents’  utilities  are  affected  by  relational  goods  and  that  productivity  paradoxes  in  trust  game 
corporations may be solved by providing occasions which lead to the creation of stocks of relational 
goods among employees.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Economists  are  traditionally  not  accustomed  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  the  logic  of  human 
relationships on socioeconomic behaviour of individuals.  
The standard prediction of a typical investment game which ignores such logic is the {0,0} Nash 
equilibrium. In such equilibrium both the Trustor and Trustee do not transfer any amount to each 
other since the assumption that any player follows a self-interested behaviour and has preferences in 
which only monetary payoffs matter is common knowledge. 
Commonly  observed  violations  of  such  equilibrium  in  such  game  have  led  to  a  broadened 
perspective on human preferences in which trust and trustworthiness are explained by fairness, 
strategic fairness, inequity aversion, altruism, etc. 
In our paper we propose an original analysis of the role of relational goods in promoting trust and 
trustworthiness  by  introducing  a  simple  original  variation  of  the  standard  investment  game, 
according to which we give players the option to meet each other at the end of the game. 
Our result are quite robust and show that the availability of the option and the decision to opt by the 
Trustor significantly increase her contribution. They also seem to suggest that part of this effect 
materialises also when the opportunity of the encounter is available and the Trustor does not opt for 
it. 
On the overall, we interpret such results by arguing that the Trustor’s extra contribution is affected 
by a strategic rationale (the expectation that the Trustee might opt and therefore contribute more 
generously even if the Trustor does not intend to meet the Trustee) and a relational good rationale   20 
(the desire to meet the other and the belief that an extra contribution will create a more favourable 
environment for the meeting). 
We explain in the paper that, in the latter case, we are testing jointly two distinct hypotheses: i) the 
Trustor has a positive taste for relational goods and ii) she believes that the extra contribution will 
increase the value of such good. 
When looking at the Trustee’s choice, we observe that the significant extra contribution does not 
arise simply from the opportunity of the encounter, but only when such opportunity is chosen by the 
Trustee, consistently with the fact that the strategic rationale does not apply for such player. 
Our results generate questions and ideas for further research and potential applications. We briefly 
discuss an important one by making reference to the literature of the application of trust games in 
modern corporations whose productivity is always more determined by the performance of complex 
task which require non overlapping consequences of different workers. We conclude by arguing 
that our findings on the positive effect of relational goods on trust and trustworthiness may provide 
interesting insights for the definition of original incentive structures that foster cooperation and 
remove productivity bottlenecks in modern corporate environments. 
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 Appendix 1: An analytical description of players’ choices 
 
A.1 The Trustor behaviour 
 
A  more  analytical  treatment  of  our  experiment  may  help  to  clarify  how  our  tests  discriminate  among 
different hypotheses on players’ preferences. 
Assume that the Trustor (sender) participating to our experiment has the following generic utility function  
( ) ∑ Ω + + + − =
i
i si
e
R s
e
s
e
R s s S X X RG X X U δ β α ) , ( 10  
where αS is the Trustor’s marginal utility of one unit of income, βS is the marginal utility arising from the 
consumption of the relational good (RG) and the δSi coefficients express the weight in the utility function of 
other non conventional preference structures (altruism, reciprocity, etc.). XS and XR are, respectively, the 
Trustor’s  and  Trustee’s  contributions,  where,  according  to  the  standard  investment  game  structure, 
s R X X 3 λ = ,  ] 10 , 0 [ ∈ S X  and ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ λ
24, so that we may reformulate the Trustor’s expectation on the 
Trustee’s contribution as 
e
R X = S s R s X E X E 3 ] [ ] [ λ = . 
RG is the specific relational good generated by the (possible) encounter with the unknown counterpart at the 
end of the game, which we assume to be a positive function of contributions of the (two) j players (j=S,R) 
( 0 \ > ∂ ∂ j X RG ). This is because such contribution is expected to affect positively dispositions, thereby 
increasing the value of the relational good arising from the encounter (see section 2). Players have two 
available (σj) strategies (a=accept, na=non accept the encounter). Consider that RG>0 only if both players 
accept to meet each other or  a RG R S = = > σ σ 0 . Hence, the value of the relational good cannot be 
known with certainty by the Trustor who has an expectation on it, conditional on her expectation about the 
Trustee’s strategy and contribution ( a RG
e
R S
e = = > σ σ 0 ). 
Finally, we take into account also the possibility that the Trustor may strategically increase her contribution 
in presence of the opportunity of the encounter, since  S s R s X E X E 3 *] [ ] [ 0 λ λ + =  with  [ ] a E
e
R = > σ λ 0 *  
and  ] 1 , 0 [ * 0 ∈ + λ λ . Note that the expected value of the second part of the Trustee contribution is higher 
than zero conditional to the Trustor’s expectation that the Trustee decides to opt for the encounter. In other 
terms, independently from the Trustor’s decision to opt from the encounter, the existence of this opportunity 
makes her consider that the Trustee could opt for the encounter and therefore increase her transfer for this 
reason.  
As a consequence, we may rewrite Trustor’s utility function as 
[ ] { } { } ∑ Ω + + − + + =
i
i si
e
R s
e
s s o S s S X X RG X E U δ β λ λ α ) , ( 1 * 3 10  
Consider that, when Nash rationality is common knowledge, δji =0 and βj=0, we necessarily get XR=0.  
Consider as well that the Trustor decides not to give anything if α>0, β and δsi =0 and  
                                                
24 According to the standard rules we adopt XS and XR can take only integer values. This implies that also λ cannot be 
continuous.   26 
[ ] 0 * 3 0 < + + − S S s X E X λ λ  or  [ ]
3
1
* 0 < + λ λ S E    
This implies that the Trustor can depart from Nash behaviour (give more than zero) also when she is self-
interested but expects that the Trustee is not. This is the case when  
[ ] { } { } 10 1 ) ( * ) ( 3 10 s s s s o S s X X X E α λ λ α > − + +  
or 
3
1
*] [ 0 > + λ λ E  
On the other hand we may have the opposite case in which a Trustor is not purely interested in monetary 
payoffs and however decides to give zero, under the case in which she decides to meet the Trustee, when
25  
( ) 10 1
e
s R s si
i
X RG α β δ − + + + Ω < ∑ ( ) 10 ( 0)
e
s R s s si
i
X RG X α β δ + + = + Ω ∑   
or  s S
e e
S X RG RG α β < = − )) 0 ( ( . 
This  implies  that,  without  controlled  experiments,  we  cannot  infer  conclusions  on  the  importance  of 
relational goods for the two agents by just looking at their contributions and eventual departures from Nash 
behaviour. 
With our controlled experiment we can instead test several hypotheses. 
 
Consider that 
i) the marginal utility of the Trustor’s contribution when the option of the encounter is not available (ONA 
case) is 
[ ] ( ) Z E
X
U
o S s
ONA S
S + − =
∂
∂
1 3 λ α  
Where Z is the value of the sum of the derivatives of the additional Ω non standard arguments in the utility 
function;  
ii) the marginal utility of the Trustor’s contribution when she does not opt for the encounter and the option of 
the encounter is available (OA/NO case) is 
[ ] { } Z E
X
U
o S s
NO OA S
S + − + =
∂
∂
1 * 3
/
λ λ α  
Based in i) and ii)  we may formulate what follows 
Hypothesis  1:  (STRATEGIC  EFFECT  ON  THE  TRUSTOR  FROM  THE  OPPORTUNITY  OF  THE 
ENCOUNTER) the Trustor will give more under ii) than under i) if λ*>0 and  0
/
>
∂
∂
NO OA S
S
X
U
. 
Consider now  
                                                
25 Remember that, for convenience, we fixed that only discrete sums can be chosen and therefore that 1 token is the 
minimum nonzero amount that can be given by the Trustor.   27 
iii) the marginal utility of the Trustor’s contribution when the option of the encounter is available and she 
does opt for the encounter (OA/O case) 
[ ] { }
/
( , )
3 * 1
e e
S s R s
s S o
S s OA O
U RG X X
E Z
X X
β
α λ λ
∂ ∂
= + − + +
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This leads to formulate the following hypothesis 
Hypothesis  2:  (RELATIONAL  EFFECT  ON  THE  TRUSTOR  FROM  THE  OPPORTUNITY  OF  THE 
ENCOUNTER)  the  Trustor  will  give  more  under  iii)  than  under  ii)  if 
NO OA S
S
X
U
/ ∂
∂
>0
26  and 
s
e
R s
e
s X
X X RG
∂
∂ ) , (
β >0, which implies that both  s β >0 and 
s
e
R s
e
X
X X RG
∂
∂ ) , (
>0.
27 
Hence, in order to accept hypothesis 2, two important conditions must jointly hold: i) the individual has a 
positive taste for relational good, ii) the relational good is a positive function of the individual contribution 
since a cooperative attitude creates better conditions for the encounter or increases the value of the relational 
good enjoyed in the encounter. 
In such test consider also that a selection bias problem may arise. Since the placement of the Trustor in one 
of the two subsamples (Trustors who opt for the encounter and Trustors who don’t) is non-random and 
voluntary, characteristics affecting other nonconventional arguments in players’ preferences may affect the 
decision to opt for the encounter. Hence, the additional contribution might depend on differences in such 
characteristics and not from the structure of the experiment. In other terms, if I am more altruistic I may be 
more likely to opt for the encounter and, by being more altruistic, I get more pleasure by giving more to the 
Trustee and this factor (and not the opportunity of the encounter) could explain my extra contribution. In 
other terms if  
NO OA O OA Z Z
/ / >  
Hypothesis 2 will not hold. 
This is the reason why we use the treatment regression model which allows us to disentangle between the 
two options. With the treatment regression model we can control for this additional effect by estimating a 
system  in which such  effect  is  measured in  an  equation  where  the decision  to  opt for  the  encounter is 
regressed on Trustor’s characteristics.  
Note that, if we include in the experiment also cases in which the option is not available, we avoid this 
inconvenient but we cannot disentangle anymore hypothesis 1 from hypothesis 2. In fact iii)>i) may depend 
both on the strategic and the relational good effect. 
                                                
26 Consider that this implies that 
3
1
*] [ 0 > +θλ λ E  since, if the Trustee gives more given the opportunity of the 
encounter but the inequality is not meet, the Trustor has no benefit in sending extra money for strategic reasons. 
27 The hypothesis that  s β <0 and 
s
e
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e
X
X X RG
∂
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<0, or that the Trustor dislikes relational goods and with an extra 
contribution want to reduce its value, can be reasonably discarded by assumption.    28 
  
1.2 The Trustee behaviour 
The Trustee utility function is simply given by 
( ) ∑ Ω + + − + =
i
i si S R
e
R s R R X X RG X U δ β λ α ) , ( 3 ) 1 ( 10  
Note that, also for the Trustee, the relational good has to be expressed with its expected value, since the 
player is not informed whether the Trustor has opted or not for the encounter.  
If the Trustee has standard (affected only by monetary payoffs and purely self interested) preferences, she 
will behave consistently with Nash equilibrium since 
( ) ( ) s R s R X X 3 ) 1 ( 10 3 10 λ α α − + > +  with λ>0. 
Consider also that the Trustee may abandon self interested behaviour when the option of the encounter is 
available if  
( ) ( ) ) , ( 3 ) 1 ( 10 3 10 S R
e
R s R s R X X RG X X β λ α α + − + < +  
or  ) , ( 3 S R
e
R R X X RG X β λ α < , that is, the monetary loss determined by the amount given back is more 
than compensated by the value of the encounter. 
Here again we can test the relational good hypothesis with a controlled experiment. Consider that  
i) the marginal utility of the Trustee if the opportunity of the encounter is not available is 
Z
X
U
R
ONA R
R + − =
∂
∂
α . 
The  expression  obviously  coincides  with    the  marginal  utility  of  the  Trustee  if  the  opportunity  of  the 
encounter is available and she does not opt for it (ii).  
iii) The marginal utility of the Trustee if the opportunity of the encounter is available and she opts for is 
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Note that the strategic effect is necessarily absent here.  
We can therefore formulate the following hypothesis on the relational effect 
Hypothesis  3:  (RELATIONAL  EFFECT  ON  THE  TRUSTEE  FROM  THE  OPPORTUNITY  OF  THE 
ENCOUNTER) the Trustor will give more under iii) than under ii) if 
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which implies that both  R β >0 and 
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28 See footnote 16 for the exclusion of the irrelevant alternatives. APPENDIX 2. Timing of the experiment  
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ENCOUNTER TREATMENTS  with survey beforehand 
 
 
 
 
Subjects sign in and 
discover their roles 
(Trustor or Trustee) 
The Trustor decides 
how many tokens (x) 
to send to the 
Trustee 
T1 
The Trustee receives 3x 
and  decides  how  many 
tokens  to  send  to  the 
Trustor 
T2  T3  T4 
Subjects fill the 
survey 
 
 
T5 
The experimenter reads 
the instructions about 
the game and the 
survey 
T1  T2  T3  T4 
Investment Game 
Subjects sign in and 
discover their roles 
(Trustor or Trustee) 
T1  T2  T3  T4 
Subjects fill the 
survey 
 
 
T5 
The experimenter reads 
the instructions about 
the game and the 
survey 
Subjects decide 
whether to meet or not 
the couterpart at the 
end of the experiment 
Subjects play the 
Investment game  
Encounter (only if both 
have decided to meet 
the counterpart)  
   
T6 
The experimenter 
reads the instructions 
about the game  
 
Subjects sign in and 
discover their roles 
(Trustor or Trustee) 
 
The experimenter 
reads the 
instructions about 
the survey 
Subjects fill the survey 
 
Subjects play the 
Investment game  
T5 
Subjects sign in and 
discover their roles 
(Trustor or Trustee) 
T1  T2  T3  T4 
Subjects fill the 
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T5 
Subjects decide 
whether to meet or not 
the counterpart at the 
end of the experiment 
Subjects play the 
Investment game  
Encounter (only if both 
have decided to meet 
the counterpart)  
   
T6 
The experimenter 
reads the instructions 
about the survey 
 
The experimenter 
reads the instructions 
about the game  
 
T7 TABLES 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics on the distribution of Trustor’s contribution under different 
subsamples  
 
Amount sent  by  the 
Trustor 
Total Sample 
(with and without 
encounter option) 
(184 obs.) 
Encounter option 
not available 
(91 obs.) 
Encounter option available  
Trustor’s decision to opt for the encounter 
Both YES and NO 
(93 obs.) 
YES 
(43 obs.) 
NO 
(45 obs.) 
0 
 (purely self-interested 
Trustors) 
11.41  19.78  3.23  2.22  4.17 
1  8.70  8.79  8.60  4.44  12.50 
2  7.61  5.49  9.68  8.89  10.42 
3  12.50  15.38  9.68  8.89  10.42 
4  15.76  13.19  18.28  13.33  22.92 
5  14.67  14.29  15.05  13.33  16.67 
6  5.43  5.49  5.38  6.67  4.17 
7  4.35  4.40  4.30  6.67  2.08 
8  3.80  3.30  4.30  4.44  4.17 
9  1.09  1.10  1.08  2.22  12.50 
10  14.67  8.79  20.43  28.89  4.17 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Percent values. 
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Table  2.  Descriptive  statistics  on  the  average  Trustor’s  contribution  under  different 
structures of the game 
 
  Obs        Mean  Std. Err.      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Total Sample  
(with and without encounter option) 
184    4.478    0.231      4.023    4.933 
           
 
Encounter 
option 
available 
(treatments 
T1A, T1B, M1A, 
M1B) 
 
Trustor decision: 
YES 
45    6.820    0.474      5.046     6.954 
           
Trustor: 
NO 
48  4.375  0.409  3.552  5.198 
           
All experiments  93  5.161    0.321  4.523  5.799 
             
 
Encounter  option  not 
available 
 (treatments TB, MBB, MBA) 
91  3.780  0.316  3.152  4.409 
           
 
Survey 
Beforehands 
(treatments T1B, MBB, M1B) 
75  4.853  0.378  4.101  5.606 
           
Survey afterwards 
 (treatments TB, T1A, MBA, M1A) 
109      4.220    0.289      3.648    4.792 
           
Trento 
(treatments TB, T1B, T1A) 
64    4.359    0.424       3.512     5.207 
           
Milano 
(treatments MBB, MBA, M1B, M1A) 
64      4.625    0.417      3.792    5.458 
           
Forlì  
(treatments FBB, FBA, F1B, F1A) 
56  4.446  0.343  3.760  5.133 
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Table 3. The effect of the option of the encounter on the probability that the Trustor  
has standard “textbook” behaviour  
 
 
 
Method 
 
Logit 
 
Logit 
Encounter  -1.934 
(0.657)
*** 
-2.744 
(1.087)
** 
Male 
 
0.818 
(0.530) 
1.673 
(0.865)
* 
Nmembers  -0.507 
(0.258)
** 
-0.546 
(0.366) 
Income   
 
0.002 
(0.241) 
Constant 
 
-0.004 
(0.994) 
-0.590 
(1.552) 
Pseudo  
R
2 
0.147  0.249 
Prob > χ
2  0.001 
 
0.002 
Number of 
obs. 
177 
 
121 
 
Legend: dependent variable: dummy taking the 
value of one in case of zero contribution of the 
Trustor and zero otherwise. Encounter: dummy 
which  takes  value  of  one  if  the  option  of  the 
encounter  is  available  or  not  for  individuals 
participating  to  the  experiment.  Male:  gender 
dummy taking the value of one if the subject is a 
male.  Nmembers:  number  of  family  members. 
Income: level of income. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant  at  1%;  Standard  errors  in  brackets 
Note: in the case of “survey after the game” and 
in  the  case  of  “Trento  sessions”  and  “Forlì 
sessions”,  the  “encounter”  dummy  predicts 
failure (dependent variable=0) perfectly 
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Table 4. The determinants of the Trustor’s contribution 
 
   
Method 
 
OLS 
 
Ologit 
 
OLS 
 
Ologit 
Rgoods  1.697 
(0.579)
*** 
1.154 
(0.392)
*** 
1.977 
(0.687)
*** 
1.368 
(0.478)
*** 
Male 
 
2.064 
(0.583)
*** 
1.292 
(0.390)
*** 
2.408 
(0.677)
*** 
1.534 
(0.460)
*** 
Nmembers  0.482 
(0.273)
* 
0.331 
(0.172)
* 
0.514 
(0.341) 
0.348 
(0.224) 
Income   
 
  -0.045 
(0.199) 
-0.027 
(0.128) 
Constant 
 
1.385 
(1.166) 
  1.320 
(1.662) 
 
cut1    -1.324 
(0.881) 
  -1.914 
(1.436) 
cut2    0.159 
(0.759) 
  0.392 
(1.114) 
cut3    0.979 
(0.759) 
  1.054 
(1.106) 
cut4    1.547 
(0.762) 
  1.539 
(1.106) 
cut5    2.417 
(0.774) 
  2.507 
(1.119) 
cut6    3.114 
(0.796) 
  3.140 
(1.139) 
cut7    3.429 
(0.811) 
  3.536 
(1.157) 
cut8    3.705 
(0.825) 
  3.879 
(1.177) 
cut9    4.009 
(0.842) 
  4.155 
(1.193) 
cut10    4.094 
(0.848) 
  4.255 
(1.199) 
Adj R
2  0.213    0.227 
 
 
Pseudo R
2    0.058    0.070 
Root MSE 
 
2.740    2.741   
Prob > F  0.000 
 
  0.000   
Prob > χ
2   
 
0.000    0.000 
Number  of 
obs. 
91 
 
91  69  69 
Legend. dependent variable: amount sent by Trustors (integer values 
from 0 to 10). Rgoods dummy which takes value of one if the Trustor 
opts for the encounter in treatments in which the option is available. 
Male: gender dummy taking the value of one if the subject is a male. 
Nmembers: number of subject’s family members. Income: level of 
income. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
Standard errors in brackets 
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Table 5. The determinants of the Trustor’s contribution (Treatment regression model) 
 
Dep. Var.  Amount sent  Decision to meet the 
Trustee 
Amount sent  Rgoods 
Male 
 
2.289 
(0.562)
*** 
  2.639  
(0.636)
*** 
 
Nmembers  0.626 
(0.250)
** 
  0.706 
(0.317)
** 
 
Income 
 
    -0.033 
(0.174) 
 
Parmarried 
 
  -.562  
(0.222)
** 
  -0.689 
(0.279)
** 
Rgoods  7.611  
(0.938)
*** 
  7.270  
(1.266)
*** 
 
Constant  -2.151  
(1.076) 
0.439 
(0.203) 
-2.514 
(1.518) 
0.596  
(0.259) 
Number of obs.  91 
 
  69   
Log likelihood    -275.017    -207.606 
Legend. Amount sent: amount sent by Trustors (integer values from 0 to 10). Rgoods: dummy which takes value of one 
if the Trustor opts for the encounter in treatments in which the option is available. Male: gender dummy taking the 
value  of  one if  the subject is a  male.  Nmembers: number  of subject’s family members. Income: level  of income. 
Parmarried: dummy which takes value of one if the parents of the subject are married. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard errors in brackets   35 
Table. 6 Descriptive statistics on the Trustee’s contribution under different experiment designs 
Total sample 
Sharerest 
(Amount payed back/ 
Total amount received) 
All 
experiments 
(163 obs.) 
Encounter option 
not available 
(73 obs.) 
Encounter option available 
  
Trustee’s decision to opt for the encounter 
YES and NO 
(90 obs.) 
YES 
(36 obs.) 
NO 
(54 obs.) 
0  26.38  26.03  26.67  16.67  33.33 
0 < sharerest ≤ 0.1  7.98  8.22  7.78  8.33  7.41 
0.1< sharerest≤ 0.2  16.56  20.55  13.33  8.33  16.67 
0.2< sharerest≤ 0.3  3.07  5.48  1.11  0.00  1.85 
0.3< sharerest≤ 0.4  21.47  19.18  23.33  25.00  22.22 
0.4< sharerest≤ 0.5  7.98  6.85  8.89  11.11  7.41 
0.5< sharerest≤ 0.6  4.29  2.74  5.56  11.11  1.85 
0.6< sharerest≤ 0.7  7.98  5.48  10.00  13.89  7.41 
0.7< sharerest≤ 0.8  1.84  0.00  3.33  5.56  1.85 
0.8< sharerest≤ 0.9  0.61  1.37  0.00  0.00  0 
0.9< sharerest≤ 1  1.84  4.11  0.00  0.00  0 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
Percent values. 
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Table  7.  Descriptive  statistics  on  the  average  Trustee’s  contribution  under  different 
experiment designs 
 
Sharerest 
(Amount  payed  back/  Total  amount 
received) 
Obs        Mean  Std. Err.      [95% Conf. Interval] 
Total Sample  
(with and without encounter option) 
 163   0.260  0.020    0.222   0.299 
           
Encounter  option  not 
available 
(treatments TB, MBB, MBA) 
73   0.249     0.031     0.188    0.310 
           
 
 
 
Encounter 
option 
available 
 (treatments 
T1A,  T1B, 
M1A, M1B) 
Option 
decision: 
YES 
 36    0.352  0.041   0.269 .  0.435 
           
Option 
decision: 
NO 
54    0.214   0.030      0.153    0.274 
           
Option 
decision: 
YES and NO 
 90  0.269  0.025     0.219  0.319 
             
Survey 
Beforhands 
(treatments T1B, MBB, M1B) 
66  0.299  0.034  0.232  0.366 
           
Survey afterwards  
(treatments TB, T1A, MBA, M1A) 
97  0.234  0.023  0.187  0.280 
           
Trento  
(treatments TB, T1B, T1A) 
 
54  0.179  0.026  0.125  0.232 
           
Milano 
 (treatments  MBB,  MBA,  M1B, 
M1A) 
55  0.283  0.039  0.206  0.361 
           
Forlì 
(treatments  FBB,  FBA,  F1B  and 
F1A) 
54  0.318  0.033  0.253  0.384 
   37 
 
Table 8. The determinants of Trustee contribution 
 
Method 
 
OLS 
 
Tobit 
 
OLS 
 
Tobit 
Rgoods  0.145 
(0.050)
*** 
0.182 
(0.065)
*** 
0.142 
(0.059)
** 
0.182 
(0.075)
** 
Male 
 
-0.008 
(0.49) 
-0.050 
(0.063) 
-0.029 
(0.059) 
-0.072 
(0.076) 
Nmembers  0.025 
(0.026) 
0.029 
(0.033) 
0.055 
(0.033) 
0.074 
(0.043)
* 
 
Income   
 
  -0.018 
(0.022) 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
Constant  
 
0.120 
(0.108) 
0.063 
(0.141) 
0.081 
(0.134) 
-0.019 
(0.173) 
Adj R-squared  0.072    0.074 
 
 
Pseudo R
2    0.128    0.157 
Root MSE 
  
0.230    0.238   
Prob > F  0.025 
 
  0.058   
Prob > χ
2   
 
0.022    0.036 
Number of obs.  89 
 
89  71  71 
Legend: dependent variable: the share of the amount paid back by Trustees on the total amount received. Rgoods 
dummy which takes value of one if the Trustor opts for the encounter for individuals participating to the treatment in 
which the option is available. Male: gender dummy taking the value of one if the subject is a male. Nmembers: number 
of subject’s family members. Income: level of income. 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Standard errors in brackets. 
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 Figure 2 The one-shot corporate trust game 
 
 
 
Source: Becchetti- Pace (2007). 